Soviet propaganda and representatives sought to downplay the importance of opposing and fighting in various ways against the Germans for a decade before the pact was signed. Molotov tried to reassure Germans of his good intentions by commenting to reporters that “fascism is a matter of taste.” [118] For its part, Germany also made a public U-turn regarding its virulent opposition to the Soviet Union, but Hitler still considered an attack on the Soviet Union to be “inevitable”. [119] On 31 March 1939, Great Britain extended Poland by a guarantee that “if action clearly threatens Poland`s independence and the Poles deem it necessary to oppose such an action by force, Britain would come to their aid.” Hitler was furious because it meant that the British were engaging in European political interests and that his land grabbing, such as the takeover of Czechoslovakia, would no longer be taken lightly. His response to the political control colleague was then heard at a rally in Wilhelmshaven: “No power on earth could break German power, and if the Western Allies thought that Germany would stand idly by while they silenced their “satellite states” to act in their best interests, they were painfully mistaken.” In the end, Hitler`s discontent with an Anglo-Polish alliance led to a restructuring of the strategy vis-à-vis Moscow. Alfred Rosenberg wrote that he had discussed with Hermann Goering the possible alliance with the Soviet Union: “If the life of Germany is at stake, we must even think about a temporary alliance with Moscow.” In early May 1939, Ribbentrop directed a film of Stalin at Hitler`s farm, watching his soldiers at a recent parade. Hitler was fascinated by the idea of allying with the Soviets, and Ribbentrop remembered Hitler and said that Stalin “looked like a man with whom he could do business.” Ribbentrop then received a nod to continue negotiations with Moscow. [30] The minutes received more media attention when they were added to an official collection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet Nazi Relations 1939-1941, edited by Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie and published on January 21, 1948. The decision to publish the main documents relating to German-Soviet relations, including the treaty and protocol, had already been taken in the spring of 1947.

Sontag and Beddie prepared the collection in the summer of 1947. In November 1947, Mr. Truman authorized the publication in person, but was selected in the run-up to the December foreign ministers` conference in London. As the negotiations at this conference were not constructive from the American point of view, the document was sent to the press. The documents made headlines around the world. [243] Foreign Ministry officials considered it a success: “The Soviet government was trampled on in a clear propaganda war.” [244] At that time, after several Gestapo NKVV conferences, Soviet NKVV officers also conducted lengthy interrogations of 300,000 Polish prisoners of war in camps[162][163][165] who were a selection process to determine who should be killed. [166] On 5 March 1940, following the Katyn massacre,[166] 22,000 soldiers and intellectuals were executed, described as “nationalists and counter-revolutionaries” or held in camps and prisons in western Ukraine and Belarus. [Citation required] In mid-June 1940, as international attention focused on the German invasion of France, Soviet NKVV troops stormed border crossings in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. [147] [169] Public administrations were liquidated [by whom?] and replaced by Soviet cadres,[147] who deported or killed 34,250 Latvians, 75,000 Lithuanians and nearly 60,000 Estonians. [170] Elections were held, where only one pro-Soviet candidate was listed for many positions, and the resulting popular assemblies immediately applied to be admitted to the Soviet Union, which was granted. [147]