Gore`s senior foreign policy adviser, Leon Fuerth, argued last week that deliveries authorized under the agreement did not meet the definition of the 1992 “advanced conventional weapons” act or change the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Leaving aside all the issues of corruption, only the strategic implications of these measures are sufficiently terrifying and worth thinking about. In January, Minister Albright sent a secret message to Russian Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov, lamenting that Moscow was not complying with the terms of the Gore-Chernomyrdine agreement. Russia did not provide the necessary accounting of the weapons transporting weapons that were delivered to Iran and are still in the pipeline, she said, and referred to a statement by Mr. Ivanov that it would take a decade before Russia concluded its arms contracts with Iran. The Committee also found that a new agreement in principle had been reached to allow the conversion of the three plutonium-producing reactors in Russia. Under the original 1994 agreement, Russia was required to close all three reactors by the year 2000. Negotiations for a new agreement, which would allow Moscow to operate the reactors as long as their cores have been transformed, became necessary because Russia said it had to exploit the reactors to supply nearby cities with heat. Details of the new agreement are still being worked out by the parties.
The Energy Agreements and Energy Policy of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission were supported by Energy Minister Hazel O`Leary and Energy and Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik. [1] These agreements included strengthening the safety of nuclear reactors, improving the efficiency and productivity of Russian natural gas production, and speeches on the Commission`s environmental policy, which included reducing pollution. [1] The Commission has also banned the use of plutonium in nuclear weapons. [1] Environmental policy was led by Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Carol Browner and Environment and Natural Resources Minister Victor Danilov-Danilyan. [1] The 1995 agreement enabled Moscow to honour existing sales contracts for certain weapons, including a diesel submarine, torpedoes, anti-ship mines and hundreds of tanks and armoured personnel. But no other weapons should be sold to Iran and all deliveries are expected to be completed by December 31. But critics counter that Mr. Gore`s zeal to accumulate deals has led to bad business in some cases. These obligations between executive officials do not have the force of law or any treaty requiring legislative ratification; Each party can unilaterally exit executive contracts without notice or penalty, a Gore employee said. As we now know, Russia was not at all serious, nor was Al Gore.
What Mr. Gore did not reveal at the press conference or later in Congress was that in exchange for Russia`s agreement to stop arms sales by the year 2000, Russia had previously obtained a free pass to sell conventional weapons to Iran. We say “free” because the authorized weapons would probably have triggered sanctions under the United States.
