ACM points out that many sustainable development initiatives do not restrict competition and therefore do not, at first, fall within the scope of the ban on cartels. This includes, for example, that since we have rightly accepted a broad concept of sustainability, the potential for compliance with the rules presented in the draft guidelines is unpleasant. The concepts of object or effect restrictions (including incidental restrictions) are not subject to a full review and most sustainability agreements are put on hold of payment. If there is a demand for sustainability, a competitive market will generally provide it. Exemptions for which cooperation is objectively necessary to meet this demand (through the creation of infrastructure or the development of a new market) are unlikely to be restrictive to the introduction or removal of existing individual and category exemptions in favour of effective cooperation. The remaining agreements are those for which consumers are not willing to pay for sustainability. As Chicken of Tomorrow has shown, sustainable development guidelines are not necessary if they follow the logic of benefits to consumers in the Commission`s guidelines. Sustainable development has become an important issue in the Netherlands, with important developments. B such as Urgenda`s decisions. The Wet ruimte voor duurzaamheidsinitiatieven was initiated and the ACM has published several vision papers and now more concrete guidelines on sustainable development agreements. These guidelines are needed to open up the market to more opportunities for cooperation between companies to achieve the Dutch climate targets. This can lead to what is called “green bleaching” of agreements, which means that some anti-competitive agreements are allowed because they promote sustainability. The question, then, is what are the limits of sustainable development initiatives.

4) Quantifying the benefits of sustainable development is not always necessary – One challenge that companies face in the past is that it can be difficult to quantify sustainability gains. The guidelines state that a qualitative justification is sufficient if: (a) the parties do not have a cumulative market share of more than 30% or b) it goes without saying that the benefits (more than) would compensate for the harm to competition. Although not so obvious, the legal coherence of Article 101, paragraph 3, of the TFUE poses a greater problem. A fair share of consumers is a single legal concept: it cannot, in some cases, require full compensation and, in other cases, no partial compensation. The definition of environmental damage agreements indicates the obligation of the Dutch state to deal with climate change, but national obligations cannot interfere with the interpretation of a concept of Community law. On the other hand, the many obligations arising from the sustainability treaties – which do not distinguish environmental damage from other sustainability violations – are ignored. The interests of the Member States can, of course, justify a derogation from EU legislation as it will be examined. However, Article 101, paragraph 3, of the EUTT is based only on the basis of differentiated treatment of environmental damage agreements, but it is possible to calculate environmental prices as a guarantee of their effectiveness. This may appease cynics, who see each initiative as a potential greenwashing, but to know that the price of sustainability is not the same as evaluating them. What`s changed? Policymakers say the evaluation of sustainable development initiatives should also take into account the “benefits to society as a whole.”