13 The conflict between Congress and the Political Department has been very long. Each interpreted the 1946 memorandum as perceived in his own interest: for Corfield, the States were, like Supreme Cycy, obsolete, on the path to independence, from which they could not, but only if they had chosen, freely enter into negotiations for a “political agreement” with the Indian government; For Nehru, the independence of the states and the disruption of the country as an “anarchy through the back door” and therefore impossible, the possibility of not having a “political agreement” was not open. The logic of this has led to the freedom of states to establish contacts as they wished – with the Constituent Assembly, if they wished to be admitted to the Union, with individual government bodies on administrative relations and with the Department of Foreign Affairs, if they were to be independent states (the long Corfield memo of 27 March 1947, R/3/1/136). The logic of the other led to the creation of a new Ministry of State, which would close all options for accession by imposing adherence to the three themes (Nehru to the Viceroy, 26 May, R/3/1/136 and 4 June, R/3/1/137). The Indian office was fidgeting between a number of points somewhere in between. Corfield`s efforts and some office resistances are well represented in L/P-S/13/1831. An important turning point in the fight for the viceroy`s support was the viceroy`s 18th meeting on 13 June (R/3/1/137), when Nehru threw Corfield in the face for “lack of talent” and called for an immediate high-level judicial inquiry. It was decided to create a Ministry of State. The ministry`s negotiations with the States are mentioned in r/1/30/39 and R/1/30/40 and are the subject of Menon`s book (Integration of Indian States). James Manor pointed out that “since the void created by the destocking of one higher power necessarily had to be filled by another,” it can be said that “the afterlife has been transmitted and it is inevitable that it will be transmitted.” (Manor, `The Deise of the Princely Order: A Reassessment`, in Jeffrey, R. (Ed.), People, Princes and Paramount Power (1970) Google Scholar, and in a personal communication.) With regard to the relative powers and capabilities of the Delhi government and state leaders, there is clearly a great deal of validity in this view. But the evolution of the inevitable history is not always as fluid as this formulation seems to be.

Nor do I suggest that the strength of the thoughts and actions of the rearguard be underestimated. This is especially true for timing – and timing can be crucial. In this regard, Manor made it clear (note 50) that his discussion should relate “primarily to states other than Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir”.” The Indian Independence Act of 1947 (1947 approximately 30 (10-11. Geo. 6.) is an act of the British Parliament that divided British India between the two new independent lords, India and Pakistan.